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COMMENT
CONFORMING THE NONCONFORMING USE: PROPOSED
LEGISLATIVE RELIEF FOR A ZONING DILEMMA
by David G. Drumm
As the growth of America's metropolitan areas continues to accelerate, it
has become increasingly necessary to rely on governmental solutions to the
problem of fashioning a livable metropolitan environment. A principal
method used to achieve this goal has been the application of comprehensive zoning ordinances;' with their use, the growth of a city may be monitored and directed to provide efficient municipal services, to maximize
land values and the tax base, and to allow for consideration of environmental and aesthetic factors. Comprehensive zoning may be constitutionally applied to restrict the future use of undeveloped lands in conformity
with planning objectives.2 Yet, as metropolitan development increasingly
involves redevelopment of inner-city areas and areas previously developed
as satellite communities beyond the city limits, the propriety of applying
comprehensive zoning ordinances is less certain. To force abandonment of
an existing use appears inequitable, especially when substantial improvements have been undertaken. Nevertheless, the continued presence of a
use that is incompatible with the city's proposed development may seriously retard development of an area. These conflicting interests create the
problem of the nonconforming use. Zoning ordinances traditionally have
been solicitous of the nonconforming use, allowing its continuance but restricting its growth or alteration. More recently, zoning ordinances have
also provided for the amortization of the nonconforming use by requiring
its eventual elimination after a period of grace. Neither approach has
proven to be a complete solution. The Model Land Development Code,3
proposed in 1975 by the American Law Institute, attempts in article 4 to
remedy various shortcomings of the restriction and amortization approaches. This Comment will assess the current approaches to the nonconforming use problem and then will analyze article 4 of the Code to
ascertain to what extent that proposal offers an improved solution to the
nonconforming use problem.
1. Comprehensive zoning is the division of an entire municipality into districts for the
purpose of restricting land use by geographical area. 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF
ZONING 21 (1968). The first comprehensive zoning plan was enacted by New York City in
1916. Bettman, Constilutionality of Zoning, 37 HARV. L. REV. 834, 834 (1924).
2. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
3. MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1975) [hereinafter referred to as the MLDC or the Code].
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ZONING AND THE NONCONFORMING USE

A.

Basis of the Zoning Power

Zoning ordinances are enacted pursuant to the police power' delegated
by the state to municipalities or other units of local government through
enabling acts.' A zoning ordinance will typically divide the territory to be
zoned into districts and will permit only a specified class of uses within
each district.6 Ideally, the ordinance will produce strict segregation of land
uses while minimizing the negative impact of a designated use on adjoining land values.'
The general zoning process was declared constitutional in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. ,' in which a landowner attacked a zoning ordinance that alle~edly had reduced the value of his land from $10,000 to
$2,500 per acre. The ordinance, the landowner claimed, violated the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution in that it deprived
him of his liberty and property without due process of law' and denied
4. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); Jones v. City of
Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14, 16 (1930).
The United States Supreme Court has defined the police power broadly: "[The police]
power is not confined. . . to the suppression of what is offensive, disorderly or unsanitary.
It extends to so dealing with the conditions which exist in the State as to bring out of them
the greatest welfare of its people." Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311, 318 (1907). See Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 472 Pa. 115, 127, 371 A.2d 461, 467, appealdismissed,
434 U.S. 807 (1977), for a recent expression of the same theory.
5. All states have delegated some zoning authority to municipalities, R. ANDERSON,
supra note 1, at 138. The delegation must be specific; a general grant of police power is
insufficent to authorize zoning. Poulos v. Caparrelli, 25 Conn. Supp. 370, 205 A.2d 382
(Super. Ct. 1964); Ellison v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 183 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1966).
6. R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 22.
7. Achieving such a result was the primary goal of the earliest zoners. See S. TOLL,
ZONED AMERICAN 183 (1969); Norton, Elimination of Incompatible Uses and Structures, 20
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 305, 307 (1955).
8. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
9. Id. The property lay in the general path of the development of Cleveland's industrial district. Cf. Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 I1. 166, 180 N.E. 767 (1932) (ordinance zoning
land residential when land across street in another municipality was used for commercial
purposes held unreasonable).
10. The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "No State
"
shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The fifth amendment provides: "No person shall be . . .
" Id.
I. amend. V. For a
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .
discussion of the application of the due process clause to the substantive content of governmental actions, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 427-55 (1978).
Virtually all state constitutions also contain a due process clause. See, e.g., CAL. CONST.
art. 1, § 13, cl. 6; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 19 (due course of the law of
the land).
Courts have recognized that the right to make future use of land is a "property" interest
for due process purposes. For example, in Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386, the presence of a property
interest was assumed explicitly in order to reach the issue of whether due process was afforded in the invasion of the landowner's property rights. For additional discussion of the
principle, see City of Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697, 700 (1953), in
which the court defined property as "not merely the ownership and possession of lands or
chattels but the unrestricted right of their use, enjoyment and disposal." See also Spann v.
City of Dallas, Ill Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513 (1921).
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him equal protection under the law." The Court upheld the ordinance,
finding it to be a constitutional exercise of the local government's police
power. The Court recognized the city's need of a flexible police power,
capable of addressing changing circumstances and conditions.l" Nevertheless, the particular exercise of the power must bear a rational relationship
to the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community.' 3 Applying these principles, the Court found the challenged zoning ordinance
constitutional; it was a means reasonably designed to meet the ends of
insuring the safety of children, economizing on municipal expenses, and
facilitating fire extinguishment. The Court warned, however, that if the
ordinance was applied arbitrarily and unreasonably, it would be unenforceable. 4
Since Euclid, courts have expanded the scope of goals in pursuit of
which the zoning power may be employed. Zoning ordinances have been
upheld with purposes as diverse as maintenance of property values,' 5 stabilization of land use,' 6 orderly development,' 7 neighborhood uniformity,'" and historic preservation.' 9
B.

The Nonconforming Use

A nonconforming use is defined as a use of land, building, or premises
that lawfully existed prior to the enactment of a zoning ordinance and that
is maintained after the effective date of such ordinance even though not in
compliance with the use restrictions applicable to the area in which it is
situated.'z Thus, a nonconforming use has been clearly established when
all necessary construction has been completed and the use has begun prior
to the effective date of the zoning ordinance. The nonconforming use must
11.The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "No State
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.This clause guarantees that individuals similarly situated will be
similarly treated by the government. See L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 991-94.
12. 272 U.S. at 387.
13. Id. at 395. See generally Noel, Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances, 41 COLUM. L.
REV. 457, 459 (1941). For examples of ordinances held unreasonable, see Sigretto v. Board
of Adjustment, 134 N.J.L. 587, 50 A.2d 492 (1946) (unreasonable to zone land residential
212, 185 N.E. 827 (1933) (unreawhen unsuitable for such use); Tews v. Woolhiser, 352 I11.
sonable to create a residential enclave within a commercial district).
14. Id. at 395. Shortly after the Euclid decision, the Supreme Court struck down a
zoning ordinance unreasonable on its facts. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183
(1928) (adjacent land zoned for industrial and railroad purposes caused plaintiff's land,
which had been zoned for residential purposes, to become of comparatively little value).
15. Forde v. City'of Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So. 2d 642 (1941); Dunlap v. City of
Woodstock, 405 Ill. 410, 91 N.E.2d 434 (1950).
16. Lewis v. District of Columbia, 190 F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
17. Granberg v. Turnham, 166 Cal. App. 2d 390, 333 P.2d 423 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958);
Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17, 118 A.2d 401 (1955); Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393
Pa. 106, 141 A.2d 606 (1958).
18. Galanes v. Town of Brattleboro, 136 Vt. 235, 388 A.2d 406 (1978).
19. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955).
20. 6 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 41.01 (1978).
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be more than occasional2 but does not have to be continuous; seasonal use
is sufficient. 22 A few jurisdictions require that the use be generally known
in the neighborhood.2 3 In addition, the use must be in existence on the
24 and must have been legal prior to
enactment date of the ordinance,
25
adoption of the ordinance.
The character of other activities sufficient to establish a nonconforming
use varies among courts. Generally, a landowner's mere contemplation or
expectation of a future land use does not entitle the landowner to nonconforming use status.2 6 In some jurisdictions the mere procurement of a
building permit does not entitle the holder to nonconforming use status.
A few courts, however, have reasoned that mere issuance of the permit is
sufficient to establish a nonconforming use on the theory that the municipality is without power to revoke its own lawfully issued permit.28 When
an owner commences improvements on his property in good faith and in
reliance on an existing zoning classification, the intended land use is normally protected as a nonconforming use. 29 New York requires that both
the expenditures and the improvements be substantial before the use will
be protected.3" Other jurisdictions have found entitlement to nonconform21.

See Durning v. Summerfield, 314 Ky. 318, 235 S.W.2d 761 (1951) (occasional use as

a carnival).
22. Civic Ass'n v. Horowitz, 318 Mich. 333, 28 N.W.2d 97 (1947) (seasonal use as a
carnival); Adams v. Kalamazoo Ice & Fuel Co., 245 Mich. 261, 222 N.W. 86 (1928) (seasonal
use as an ice house).
23. See, e.g., Fairlawns Cemetery Ass'n v. Zoning Comm'n, 138 Conn. 434, 86 A.2d 74
(1952); Wunderlich v. Town of Webster, 117 N.H. 283, 371 A.2d 1177 (1977).
24. Fairlawns Cemetery Ass'n v. Zoning Comm'n, 381 Conn. 434, 86 A.2d 74 (1952);
Whitpain Township v. Bodine, 372 Pa. 509, 94 A.2d 737 (1953).
25. Ralston Purina Co. v. Acrey, 220 Ga. 788, 142 S.E.2d 66 (1965) (burden of proof is
on person seeking to establish legality of nonconforming use); Eggert v. Board of Appeals,
29 I11.2d 591, 195 N.E.2d 164 (1963) (building code violation); In re Besthoffv. Zoning Bd.
of Appeals, 34 A.D.2d 782, 311 N.Y.S.2d 58, 59 (1970) (violation of prior zoning ordinance);
Larson v. Howland, 108 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (violation of restrictive covenant).
Technical illegalities are sometimes waived by the courts. See City of Middlesboro
Planning Comm'n v. Howard, 551 S.W.2d 556 (Ky. 1977) (violation of revenue producing
measure); In re Yocum, 393 Pa. 148, 141 A.2d 601 (1958) (violation of restrictive covenant);
Town of Scituate v. O'Rourke, 103 RI. 499, 239 A.2d 176 (1968) (unlicensed junkyard); City
of Franklin v. Gerovac, 55 Wis. 2d 51, 197 N.W.2d 772 (1972) (unenforced zoning ordinance).
26. See, e.g., Sherman-Colonial Realty Corp. v. Goldsmith, 155 Conn. 175, 230 A.2d
568, 572 (1967); Wunderlich v. Town of Webster, 117 N.H. 283, 371 A.2d 1177 (1977); Cook
v. Haynes, 63 A.D.2d 817, 406 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1978); Smith v. Juillerat, 161 Ohio St. 424, 119
N.E.2d 611 (1954).
27. See, e.g., Ellentuck v. Klein, 570 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1978); Richmond Corp. v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 254 Md. 244, 255 A.2d 398 (1969); Navin v. Town of Exeter, 115 N.H.
248, 339 A.2d 12 (1975); People ex rel. Ortenberg v. Bales, 224 A.D. 87, 229 N.Y.S. 550
(1928), afT'd, 250 N.Y. 598, 166 N.E. 339 (1929).
28. See, e.g., Appeal of Klein, 395 Pa. 157, 149 A.2d 114 (1959); Wasilewski v.
Biedrzycki, 180 Wis. 633, 192 N.W. 989 (1923).
At least one ordinance has expressly protected the holders of building permits from zoning amendments. See ZONING RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE CITY OF SYRACUSE
§ 5.4.2 (1959), cited in Anderson, The Nonconforming Use-A Productof Euclidian Zoning,
10 SYRACUSE L. REV. 214, 221 (1959).
29. See A. Ferland & Sons v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 105 R.I. 275, 251 A.2d 536, 537-38
(1969).
30. See Town of Lima v. Harper, 55 A.D.2d 405, 390 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1977) (expenditures
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ing use status based on incidental or negligible expenditures." Some
courts require that the expenditures represent a certain percentage of the
total project cost before a nonconforming use may be established.32 The
expenditures for a landowner's improvements on the property must have
been made in good faith; expenditures made in order to establish a use
prior to the effective date of an impending zoning change generally cannot
establish a nonconforming use.33
Euclid did not discuss the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance that
sought to eliminate uses antedating the ordinance.34 Initially this issue
was avoided by the proponents of zoning lest the cause of zoning in general be harmed.3" Draftsmen of the early zoning ordinances simply exempted nonconforming uses. 3 6 In several states statutes extend state-wide
protection to the nonconforming use.3 7 The zoning advocates felt that
such a concession would not greatly impair the effectiveness of zoning
since they anticipated that the nonconforming uses would be eliminated
naturally over the course of time.3 8 To facilitate this process of natural
atrophy the ordinances frequently included restrictions on the mainteof $17,600 for paving and piping of mobile home park did not establish a nonconforming
use for the entire park because they primarily benefited already developed lots); In re Lefrak
Forest Hills Corp. v. Galvin, 40 A.D.2d 211, 218, 338 N.Y.S.2d 932, 938 (1972) ($1,450,000
in already incurred costs and $5,800,000 additional contractual obligation were substantial).
31. Compare People ex rel Skokie Town House Builders, Inc. v. Village of Morton
Grove, 16 11.2d 183, 157 N.E.2d 33 (1959) (expenses incurred in drafting construction plans
and obtaining permits sufficient to establish a nonconforming use) and Board of Supervisors
v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 213 Va. 359, 193 S.E.2d 1 (1972) (expenses incurred in preparing and
filing a site plan sufficient to establish a nonconforming use) with Sherman-Colonial Realty
Corp. v. Goldsmith, 155 Conn. 175, 230 A.2d 568 (1967) (owner required to show that engineering expenses could not be recouped) and Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. v. Gaithersburg,
266 Md. 117, 291 A.2d 672 (1972) (owner required to begin construction).
32. See Molin v. Mayor of Glassboro, 116 N.J. Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1971); Reichenbach v. Windward at Southampton, 80 Misc. 2d 1031, 364 N.Y.S.2d 283,
a]J'dmem., 372 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1975).
33. See, e.g., Graham Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 1, 97 A.2d 564
(1953); City of Hollywood v. Hollywood Beach Hotel Co., 283 So. 2d 867 (Fla. App. 1973);
Donadio v. Cunningham, 58 N.J. 309, 277 A.2d 375 (1971); Town of Hillsborough v. Smith,
276 N.C. 48, 170 S.E.2d 904 (1969).
34. See notes 8-14 supra and accompanying text.
35. The public feared that zoning would involve forced removal of existing business.
Norton, supra note 7, at 308. Also, prior to Euclid, zonin&advocates feared that attempted
retroactive application would cause invalidation of zoning in general on constitutional
grounds. Comment, Retroactive Zoning Ordinances,39 YALE L.J. 735, 737 (1930).
36. See Bettman, supra note 1, at 853. A typical early clause provided: "The lawful use
of a building or premises existing at the time of the adoption of this ordinance may be
continued, although such use does not conform with the provisions hereof, and such use may
be extended throughout the building." WAUKEGAN, ILL. ZONING ORD. § 29 (1924) quoted
in Note, Amortization of Property Uses Not Conforming to Zoning Regulations, 9 U. CHI. L.
REV. 477, 478 n.5 (1942). See also ordinances cited In Comment, The Abatement of Preexisting Nonconforming Uses under Zoning Laws: Amortization, 57 Nw. L. REV. 323, 323 n. 1
(1962).
37. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 9-462.02 (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-2 (1979); HAWAil REV. STAT. § 205-8 (1976); KAN. STAT. § 12-709 (1975); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 6
(Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 366.18 (West 1976); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 10-9-6 (1973).
38. Norton, supra note 7, at 307.
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39
nance of nonconforming uses. Courts generally upheld such restrictions
and sanctioned the legislative intent to eliminate gradually all nonconforming uses."

II.

RESTRICTION OF THE NONCONFORMING USE

A. Restrictions on Altering the Nonconforming Use
The establishment of nonconforming use status does not create the unrestricted right to engage in all types of nonconforming use. Ordinances
typically provide that the use must remain identical to or at least substantially similar to the initial use.4 Some ordinances permit change of a nonconforming use to any use allowed under the same or a more restrictive
zoning classification." A commendable feature of this form of regulation
is that gradual improvement in the character of the use is encouraged. 3
B.

Restrictions on Expansion of the Nonconforming Use

Most zoning ordinances contain provisions limiting the expansion of
nonconforming uses.' These provisions are construed broadly, precluding activities such as erection of new buildings, 45 employment of a greater
land area,46 and expansion of an existing building.4 7 The criteria a court
will use to find that an expansion has occurred, however, are not always
self-evident. A New York court, for example, ruled that a nightclub's
39. See, e.g., Waslinger v. Miller, 154 Colo. 61, 388 P.2d 250 (1964) (prohibition of
extension or enlargement); Auditorium, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 47 Del. 373, 91 A.2d
528 (1952) (prohibition of resumption of nonconforming use after abandonment); Phillips v.
Village of Oriskany, 57 A.D.2d 110, 394 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1977) (prohibition of change in nonconforming use); Application and Appeal of Hastings, 252 N.C. 327, 113 S.E.2d 433 (1960).
40. Nonconforming uses "may be regulated, and even girded to the point that they
wither and die." City of Columbus v. Union Cemetery Ass'n, 342 N.E.2d 298, 300-01 (Ohio
1976). See also Kelly Supply Co. v. Anchorage, 516 P.2d 1206, 1210 (Alaska 1973); Beerwort v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 144 Conn. 731, 137 A.2d 756 (1958); Peterson v. Burt, 42
Wis. 2d 284, 166 N.W.2d 207, 210 (1969).
41. 6 P. ROHAN, supra note 20, § 41.03[2][a]. An example of such an ordinance is
presented in Everpure Ice Mfg. Co. v. Board of Appeals, 324 Mass. 433, 86 N.E.2d 906
(1949).
42. See Stern v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 140 Conn. 241, 99 A.2d 130 (1953); City of
Hagerstown v. Wood, 257 Md. 558, 263 A.2d 532 (1970); Redford Moving & Storage Co. v.
City of Detroit, 336 Mich. 702, 58 N.W.2d 812 (1953).
43. Anderson, supra note 28, at 225.
44. 6 P. ROHAN, supra note 20, § 41.0313][a].
45. City of New Orleans v. Langenstein, 91 So. 2d 114 (La. App. 1956); Gerling v.
Board of Zoning Appeals, 6 A.D.2d 247, 176 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1958). But see Great South Bay
Marine Corp. v. Norton, 58 N.Y.S.2d 172 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (building allowed when reasonable and natural accessory to existing nonconforming use), aft'd, 292 A.D. 1069, 75 N.Y.S.2d
304 (1947); City of Spring Valley v. Hurst, 530 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1975, writ refd n.r.e.) (new building allowed absent substantial evidence that nonconforming use would be extended).
46. Evans v. Little Rock, 221 Ark. 252, 253 S.W.2d 347 (1943); Minquadale Civic Ass'n
v. Kline, 42 Del. Ch. 378, 212 A.2d 811 (1965); Schaeffer v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 32 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 261, 378 A.2d 1054 (1977).
47. Heagan v. Borough of Allendale, 42 N.H. 472, 127 A.2d 181 (1956). But see Town
of Seabrook v. D'Agata, 116 N.H. 412, 362 A.2d 182 (1976) (only expansion of nonconforming features is prohibited).
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change in entertainment from a band to "dancing girls" was not an unlawful expansion whereas an altered schedule of operation was.4 8 Courts
often base their decisions on a distinction between extension and intensification of the use.49 Generally, developments that do not involve spatial or
temporal expansions or effect only a qualitative change in the scope of
operation are permitted as intensifications. Thus, the operator of a nonconforming use is allowed to increase the volume of his business,5 0 to
make use of the entire tract held when the land use was established, 5 ' or to
add incidental structures.5 2 An owner of nonconforming property is also
allowed to make ordinary repairs or otherwise maintain his premises,53
and to modernize his operation. 4
55
Pennsylvania applies a more liberal doctrine of "natural expansion"
that permits the construction of new buildings on existing land,5 6 the subdivision of apartment buildings, 57 and the placement of new storage
tanks. 8 The doctrine does not apply, however, to expansion onto land
acquired after the enactment of the ordinance 59 or to expansion that would
be detrimental to the public health, safety, or welfare.6" Similarly, in other
jurisdictions a right of expansion to a stated percentage of the original size
may be granted by ordinance. 6 ' Even when the ordinance prohibits ex48. Incorporated Village of Williston Park v. 280 Hillside Ave. Restaurant Corp., 55
A.D.2d 927, 390 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1977).
49. See City of Central City v. Knowlton, 265 N.W.2d 749 (Iowa 1978); Nyburg v.
Solmson, 205 Md. 150, 106 A.2d 483 (1954); Keller v. City of Bellingham, 20 Wash. App. I,
578 P.2d 881 (1978).
50. See Truly v. Nielson, 121 So. 2d 754 (La. App. 1960); Frost v. Lucey, 231 A.2d 441
(Me. 1967); Ruhm v. C.P. Craska, Inc., 59 A.D.2d 1016, 399 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1977).
51. See Fairmeadows Mobile Village, Inc. v. Shaw, 30 Misc. 2d 143, 211 N.Y.S.2d 592
(1961) (expansion of trailer park permitted to develop more spaces than in use when ordinance passed). Contra, Blundell v. City of West Helena, 258 Ark. 123, 522 S.W.2d 661
(1975) (trailer park not permitted to expand beyond lots developed when ordinance passed).
52. See Great South Bay Marine Corp. v. Norton, 58 N.Y.S.2d 172 (Sup. Ct. 1945),
affid, 272 A.D. 1069, 75 N.Y.S.2d 304 (1947).
53. See Fontana v. Atkinson, 212 Cal. App. 2d 499, 28 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1963); Sitgreaves
v. Board of Adjustment, 136 N.J.L. 21, 54 A.2d 451, 455 (1947).
54. See Irby v. Panama Ice Co., 184 La. 1082, 168 So. 306 (1936) (change from steam to
internal combustion engine); Town of Wayland v. Lee, 325 Mass. 637, 91 N.E.2d 835 (1950)
(use of machinery to replace work done by hand); Protokowicz v. Lesofski, 69 N.J. Super.
436, 174 A.2d 385 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1961) (use of larger trucks in trucking business).
55. The doctrine, based on the interpretation of due process as enunciated in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), first appeared in In re Gilfillan's Permit,
291 Pa. 358, 362, 140 A. 136, 138 (1927). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
[A]s the property was then used for lawful purposes, the city was without
power to. . .prevent the owner from making such necessary additions to the
existing structure as were needed to provide for its natural expansion and the
accommodation of increased trade, so long as such additions would not be
detrimental to the public welfare, safety and health.
56. Eitnier v. Kreitz Corp., 404 Pa. 406, 410-11, 172 A.2d 320, 322-23 (1961).
57. Silver v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 435 Pa. 99, 103-04, 255 A.2d 506, 508 (1969).
See also In re Fried-El Corp. v. Hempfield Township, 34 Pa. Commw. Ct. 341, 383 A.2d
1286 (1978) (subdivision of townhomes).
58. Humphreys v. Stuart Realty Corp., 364 Pa. 616, 620-21, 73 A.2d 407, 409-10 (1950).
59. Id.; In re Gilfillan's Permit, 291 Pa. 358, 362, 140 A. 136, 138 (1927).
60. Gross v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 424 Pa. 603, 227 A.2d 824 (1967); Township of
Kelly v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 36 Pa. Commw. Ct. 509, 388 A.2d 347 (1978).
61. See, e.g., Robert's Running Creek Mobile Home Park, Inc. v. Landolfi, 56 A.D.2d

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 33

pansion, courts have allowed expansion upon a showing of hardship62 or a
showing that the limitation is without a substantial relation to health,
safety, morals, or general welfare.63
C.

Restrictions on Resumption of the Use After Abandonment or
Discontinuance

Zoning ordinances commonly provide for the termination of the right to
resume an abandoned nonconforming use.64 Abandonment consists of
two elements: discontinuance, and intent to abandon. 65 Some courts have
required a clear showing of intent, 66 while others have regarded the discontinuance itself as conclusive evidence of the intent to abandon. 67 A
split in authority also exists as to whether intent is required when the ordinance is phrased in terms of discontinuance, as opposed to abandonment.68
When discontinuance is involuntary, most courts addressing the issue
have considered causing an owner to forfeit his nonconforming use to be
inequitable. 69 The exception to this general rule concerns the destruction
933, 392 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1977); cf. Beckish v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 162 Conn. 1I, 291
A.2d 208 (1971) (allowing expansion to floor area of existing building). Similarly, in Pennsylvania the right of natural expansion may be limited to a given percentage of the original
area. Philadelphia v. Angelone, 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 119, 125, 280 A.2d 672, 675 (1971) (10%
limit); In re Groff, I Pa. Commw. Ct. 439, 274 A.2d 574 (1971) (50% limit).
62. See, e.g., Home Fuel Oil Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 5 N.J. Super. 63, 68 A.2d 412
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1949); Crudeli v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 73 R.I. 301, 55 A.2d 284
(1947) (hardship to disallow building of a driveway providing access to a building lawfully
under construction); cf. Snyder v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 139, 341 A.2d
446 (1975) (applicant seeking variance for expansion of nonconforming use must show same
hardship as any other applicant for variance).
63. See Hoffarth v. County of St. Clair, 51 111.App. 3d 763, 366 N.E.2d 365 (1977)
(prohibition of the expansion of archery range in rural area unreasonable).
64. See Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach, 6 Cal. 3d 279, 491 P.2d 369, 98 Cal. Rptr. 785
(1971); City of Lima v. Hempker, 118 Ohio App. 321, 194 N.E.2d 585 (1962). A mere
change in ownership is not an abandonment; instead, the new owner acquires the right to the
nonconforming use. People v. Smith, 38 111.App. 3d 798, 349 N.E.2d 91 (1976); Builder's
Supply & Lumber Co. v. Village of Hillside, 26 11. App. 2d 458, 168 N.E.2d 801 (1960);
Watts v. City of Helena, 151 Mont. 138, 439 P.2d 767 (1968); Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North
Salt Lake City, 19 Utah 2d 329, 431 P.2d 559, 564 (1967); cf.O'Conner v. City of Moscow,
69 Idaho 37, 202 P.2d 401 (1949) (termination of right to nonconforming use on change of
ownership held unconstitutional).
65. A, T & G, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 113 R.I. 458, 322 A.2d 294 (1974).
66. See, e.g., People ex rel. Delgado v. Morris, 334 111.App. 557, 79 N.E.2d 839 (1948)
(involuntary vacancy due to inability to secure tenants not an abandonment); Borough of
Saddle River v. Bobinski, 108 N.J. Super. 6, 259 A.2d 727 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1969) (nonuse for 27 years, but no abandonment).
67. See, e.g., Branch v. Powers, 210 Ark. 836, 197 S.W.2d 928 (1946); Borough of West
Mifflin v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 485, 284 A.2d 320 (1971); see also State ex
rel. Brizes v. De Pledge, 162 N.E.2d 234 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
68. Some courts have construed discontinuance as equivalent to abandonment, requiring the element of intent. See Dubitzky v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 160 Conn. 120, 273
A.2d 876 (1970); Smith v. Howard, 407 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Ky. 1966); State ex rel. Peterson v.
Burt, 42 Wis. 2d 284, 166 N.W.2d 207 (1969) (one year discontinuance while placarded by
building inspections department).
69. Krul v. Board of Adjustment, 122 N.J. Super. 18, 298 A.2d 308 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1972), a'd, 126 N.J. Super. 150, 313 A.2d 220 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973) (building destroyed by fire); Las Cruces v. Neff, 65 N.M. 414, 338 P.2d 731 (1959) (advertising sign
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of a building by an act of God." In this situation, since the owner's investment has been lost, the reason for continuing the nonconforming use no
longer exists. 7' Ordinances frequently terminate the right of the owner to
rebuild when more than a certain percentage of the building has been destroyed by an act of God. 72 Similarly, if the building housing the nonconforming use has been razed by its owners, some ordinances do not allow
the structure to be rebuilt.7 3
III.

ELIMINATION OF THE NONCONFORMING USE

Nonconforming uses have proven to be more durable than the original
zoning advocates anticipated.7 4 Rather than withering away, many such
uses have thrived because the establishment of zoning has bestowed on
them a monopolistic position by preventing the establishment of competing enterprises within the zoned area. 75 Their continued presence, however, has been detrimental; in several instances, nonconforming uses have
reduced the effectiveness of zoning ordinances, depressed property values,
and contributed to the growth of urban blight. 76 Moreover, a nonconforming use may serve as a justification for granting variances to other property
owners in the vicinity, furthering the decline of the neighborhood. 7 Some
authorities have even singled out the nonconforming use as the fundamental problem of the zoning system.7 8
The problems caused by the durability of nonconforming uses require
that affirmative measures be taken if the number of nonconforming uses is
to be significantly reduced. The emergence of widespread application of
such measures prompts a close look at their constitutionality, centering on
the proper relative weights to be given to the police power and the private
property interest.
damaged by unknown cause); Brous v. Town of Hempstead, 272 A.D. 31, 69 N.Y.S.2d 258

(1947) (cabanas destroyed by hurricane); 6 P. ROHAN, supra note 20, § 41.03[6], at 41-108.
70. See, e.g., City of Minot v. Fisher, 212 N.W.2d 837 (N.D. 1973); Marchese v. Norristown Borough Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 2 Pa. Commw. Ct. 84, 277 A.2d 176 (1971).
71. State ex rel. Covenant Harbor Bible Camp v. Steinke, 7 Wis. 2d 275, 96 N.W.2d

356, 361 (1959); 3 A.

RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING

§ 61-7 (4th ed.

1975).
72. See City of Countryside v. Oak Park Nat'l Bank, 78 II1. App. 2d 313, 223 N.E.2d
293 (1966) (50% of replacement cost); State ex rel. Nealy v. Cole, 442 S.W.2d 128 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1969).
73. See Weldon v. Zoning Bd., 250 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1977); Angus v. Miller, 363
N.E.2d 1349 (Mass. App. 1977).
74. City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34, 40 (1954); Anderson, supra note 28, at 215.

75. Grant v. Mayor of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 308, 129 A.2d 363, 365 (1957); Norton,
supra note 7, at 308.
76. See Graham, Legislative Techniques/or the Amortization of the Nonconforming Use:
.4 Suggested Formula, 12 WAYNE L. REV. 435,435 (1966); Comment, Eliminationof Nonconforming Uses.- Alternatives and Adjuncts to Amortization, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 354, 355
(1966).
77. Note, supra note 36, at 479 n.16.
78. Grant v. Mayor of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 308, 129 A.2d 363, 365 (1957); Note,
supra note 36, at 479.
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ConstitutionalPowers

Several United States Supreme Court decisions7 9 antedating the advent
of comprehensive zoning established the broad proposition that a regulation based on the police power may constitutionally limit the value or use
of private property without providing compensation to the landowner.8"
Only if the end sought to be obtained was not within the proper scope of
the police power or if the means chosen were not reasonably related to the
end would the Court invalidate the regulation. 8 Regulations that satisfied
this test were upheld, despite the fact that they inflicted a severe loss on the
affected landowners. 82 For example, in Hadacheck v. Sebastian83 the owner of a brick kiln that had been established seven years before the city
limits of Los Angeles had expanded to encompass the site of the kiln,
sought to have an ordinance prohibiting the manufacture of brick in certain areas declared invalid. The United States Supreme Court held that
there was sufficient evidence on which to base the conclusion that brick
kilns represent a threat to health and safety.84 In sweeping terms, the
Court justified interference with private property interests in order to secure collective benefits:
A vested interest cannot be asserted against [the police power of a
state] because of conditions once obtaining. . . . To so hold would
preclude development and fix a city forever in its primitive conditions.
There must be progress, and if in its march private interests are in the
way they must yield to the good of the community. The logical result
of petitioner's contention would seem to be that a city could not be
formed or enlarged against the resistance of an occupant of the
ground and that if it grows at all it can only grow as the environment
of the occupations that are usually banished to the purlieus.8 5
The first Supreme Court decision to recognize the property owner's right
to protection against the operation of a regulatory statute reasonably related to a permissible public end was Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.8 6 A
state statute prohibited the mining of coal deposits if such mining would
cause the collapse of residential structures supported by the underlying
79. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (brick kiln abated as a nuisance);
Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (livery stable abated as a nuisance);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (operation of brewery made unlawful by prohibition
statute).
80. " '[A]cts done in the proper exercise of governmental powers, and not directly encroaching upon private property, though these consequences may impair its use,' do not
constitute a taking within the meaning of the constitutional provision .... ." Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887) (quoting Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642
(1878)).
81. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 n.2 (1961); United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391
(1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277
U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 409-10 (1915).
82. See notes 79 & 80 supra.
83. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
84. Id. at 409-10.
85. Id. at 410 (citation omitted).
86. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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coal. Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, found the statute to be unconstitutional as an uncompensated taking of the mineral owner's property
rights.87 The Court reasoned that the ownership of coal includes the right
to mine it and found that the prohibition of mining activities would have
the same economic effect as an actual appropriation of the coal reserves,88
which unquestionably would constitute a compensable taking. In the
Court's view, the zoning statute was an attempt to accomplish the result of
an exercise of eminent domain without the concurrent obligation to provide compensation.8 9 Justice Holmes described the difference between the
police power and the eminent domain power as one of degree, not of kind:
"[w]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking." 9 ° Two factors were emphasized
in deciding that the regulation under scrutiny in Pennsylvania Coal was so
restrictive as to constitute a taking. First, the diminution in the value of
the owner's property was large, in that the property's primary value derived from the coal reserves. 9 Secondly, the public interest promoted by
the statute was small. From these two considerations, subsequent courts 92
and commentators9 3 have fashioned a balancing test whereby the value of
the regulation to the public is weighed against the losses of the affected
property owners in order to determine if the regulation's effect is so severe
as to constitute a taking. If the social benefit realized by prohibiting a
certain use is high, greater hardship to individual landowners is tolerated.94 Conversely, if the social benefit is minimal, less hardship to indi87. The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that property may
not be taken for public use without "just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This
clause is known as the eminent domain clause. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 554-55 (1977). Eminent domain is the implied power of the
government to exert dominion over private property on account of public exigency or for the
public good. Id. at 556-57. The eminent domain clause has been applied to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Griggs v. Allegheny County,
369 U.S. 84 (1962); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The constitution
of every state except North Carolina also contains a clause requiring compensation for takings of private property. Twenty-six states also provide compensation for property "damaged." W. STOEBUCK, NONTRESSPASSORY TAKINGS IN EMINENT DOMAIN 5 (1977).
88. 260 U.S. at 414.
89. Id. at 416.
90. Id. at 415. Pennsylvania Coal could have been decided without a consideration of
the taking issue. The surface owner's deed included an express provision waiving any claim
against the coal company arising out of subsidence damage. 260 U.S. at 412. The coal
company argued that the Pennsylvania statute unconstitutionally impaired the obligation of
contract, id. at 394-95, but the Court bypassed this contention and reached the taking issue.
91. Id. at 414.
92. See City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34, 44 (1954);
Evanston Best & Co. v. Goodman, 369 Ill. 207, 211, 16 N.E.2d 131, 133 (1938); City of
Seattle v. Martin, 54 Wash. 2d 541, 342 P.2d 602, 604 (1959). See generally I A. RATHKOPF,
supra note 71, § 6.07 for a discussion of the factors considered by courts in applying the
balancing test.
93. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 139, 195-211 (1973); 1
A. RATHKOPF supra note 7 1, § 6.07.
94. In Livingston Rock & Gravel Co. v. Los Angeles County, 43 Cal. 2d 121, 272 P.2d 4
(1954), rev'g 260 P.2d 811 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953), the California Supreme Court upheld an
ordinance that provided for revocation of an exemption for nonconforming uses upon a
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vidual landowners is needed to characterize the loss as a taking.95
Although the principle that a regulation can become a taking provides
the Court with a constitutional basis for protecting a landowner from burdensome police power regulations, this theory is deficient in that it blurs
the distinction between police power and eminent domain. The generally
accepted definition of a taking by eminent domain contemplates a
mandatory transfer of a property interest to the government. 96 This defini97
tion is consistent with the Court's opinions prior to Pennsylvania Coal.
In Pennsylvania Coal,however, the government did not actually acquire a
property interest; the challenged statute merely restricted the permissible
use of property. 98 The characterization of the regulation as a taking thus
produced definitional uncertainty. Further, had the statute been an actual
exercise of the eminent domain power, upon a finding that the taking was
for a public use, the Court should have upheld the taking but required that
compensation be provided the affected landowner.99 By voiding the statute entirely, the Court implicitly treated the statute as something other
than a taking.
Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Pennsylvania Coal, noted the fundamental dissimilarity between the eminent domain and police powers and denied that a police power regulation could ever rise to the level of a taking.
In the view of Justice Brandeis, a police power regulation could be invalidated only under the due process clause." ° Brandeis further viewed the
due process clause as containing only two requirements: that a governmental regulation be directed toward a permissible end of the police power
finding that the use was so detrimental to the public health or safety as to constitute a nuisance.
95. See, e.g., People v. Kesbec, Inc., 281 N.Y. 785, 24 N.E.2d 476 (1939) (use of land as
a parking lot did not entitle the owner to nonconforming use status because there was no
significant hardship in requiring discontinuance); People v. Wolfe, 272 N.Y. 607, 5 N.E.2d
355 (1936). See also People v. Miller, 304 N.Y. 105, 108, 106 N.E.2d 34, 35 (1952), which
held that the keeping of pigeons as a hobby was not entitled to nonconforming use protection. The court in Miller characterized the vested rights approach as "but another way of
saying that the property interest affected by the particular ordinance is too substantial to
justify its deprivation in light of the objectives to be achieved by enforcement of the provision." Id.
96. Stoebuck, supra note 87, at 570. The transfer in many cases must be viewed at a
high level of abstraction such as, for example, a transfer of an easement or a forced release
of a restrictive covenant. Nevertheless, even abstract transfers are readily distinguishable
from ordinary regulations, which effect no transfer at all. W. STOEBUCK, supra note 87, at
200.
97. See United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903), and Pampelly v. Green Bay Co.,
80 U.S. 166 (1871), in which government improvements completely and permanently flooding private property were held to constitute takings. These holdings were limited to situations in which the government had effected an actual physical ouster of the owner's
possession in Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217 (1904) and Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887). See also Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851); Callendar v.
Marsh, 18 Mass. (I Pick.) 418 (1823); Stuyvesant v. Mayor of New York, 7 Cow. 587, 605
(N.Y. 1827).
98. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
99. See Costonis, "Fair"Compensationand the Accommodation Power. Antidotesfor the
Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021, 1034-35 (1975).
100. 260 U.S. at 417-18.
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and that the means be reasonably related to that end. As the statute met
the requirements of due process in that it was a reasonable means of accomplishing a valid end, Brandeis would have upheld it.'
While the dissent in Pennsylvania Coal avoided confusion between police power regulations and eminent domain takings, its interpretation of
the due process requirement was inadequate because the opinion would
have provided little protection for landowners. Justice Brandeis apparently ignored an additional element of the due process analysis that requires that the means chosen be "not unduly oppressive upon
individuals."' 2 By focusing the analysis on this criterion, the concerns
that caused Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis to disagree can be reconciled. This consideration allows a court to balance a regulation's impact
on an individual property owner against the weight of the public interest to
be served. At the same time, it avoids characterizing a regulation as a
taking. 103
Compelling reasons favor the due process characterization of the bal101. Id. at 419-20.
102. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894). In Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590, 595 (1962), this language was held to be still valid. In Goldblatt, although the challenged ordinance's impact on the property owner was analyzed under a due process standard, the Court inferred that an ordinance could pass the reasonableness test and
nevertheless be an unconstitutional taking. 369 U.S. at 594. Since the extent of the landowner's loss was considered as an element of the reasonableness test, however, the Court
simply could have merged the Pennsylvania Coal standard into the due process test, rather
than continue to regard the two tests as separate.
103. Careful scrutiny of the landowner's burden by the Supreme Court would be a departure from the Court's current position of minimal scrutiny when confronted with substantive due process issues. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937). The use of more than minimal scrutiny in the area of property regulations could
exist side by side with established constitutional doctrines of substantive due process. First,
the balancing analysis does not inquire into the rationality of the regulation as a means to
the desired end. The minimal rationality test would thus continue to be the exclusive standard for gauging the relationship between means and end, which is the context in which it
was developed. Secondly, the minimal rationality test also would be properly utilized when
the state has adopted an administrative procedure for balancing the public gain against the
regulation's impact on individuals, as opposed to society at large.
This form of balancing is distinct from the type of analysis used by a legislature in considering the wisdom of a legislative proposal. The legislature determines whether the proposed
legislation will produce a net social benefit. A regulation may produce a net social benefit
and therefore be a wise policy choice despite the fact that it severely burdens some individuals. To determine if the burden is so severe as to warrant compensation, the circumstances
of each individual must be considered on a case-by-case basis. A legislature deals with
broad social policy, not individual cases. Therefore, an administrative procedure by which
the burdens of individual property owners may be weighed against the public gain pursuant
to a legislatively set formula would be the proper vehicle for resolution of the compensation
question. See Costonis, supra note 99. Deference should be given to a state's implementation of the balancing approach. A reviewing court should look behind a state legislature's
resolution of the balancing issue only when the state (a) has failed to provide a balancing
formula, (b) has provided a formula that is on its face unduly restrictive of private property
rights, or (c) has refused to apply its adopted formula to a given situation. Among the
commentators who have advocated a legislatively fixed compensation formula are
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness.- Comments on the Ethical Foundation of "Just
Compensation'Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of
Inverse Condemnation: The Scope of Legislative Power, 19 STAN. L. REV. 727 (1967); Van
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ancing test. First, analysis of a property use regulation solely in due process terms preserves the distinction between eminent domain power and
police power. Secondly, and most importantly, evaluating a regulation
under the due process clause avoids the requirement under the taking
Just compensation has been
clause that "just compensation" be given.'
defined as monetary compensation in an amount equal to the fair market
value of the highest permissible use of the affected property.' 5 The definition is inflexible and has the potential of making the cost of land use planning prohibitive. 0 6 Its removal, therefore, is salutary. Thirdly, the
attending an exercise of the eminent
cumbersome procedural requirements
10 7
domain power are avoided.
B.

The Nonconforming Use as a Vested Right

Although state courts have confused the concepts of taking and due
process, 08 they generally have adopted an approach balancing the public
interest against individual property rights in judging the constitutionality
of a zoning ordinance.° 9 The balancing approach has proven to be flexible and utilitarian when applied to conflicts involving prospective zoning.'" 0 Courts have had conceptual difficulties, however, in applying the
Alstyne, Taking or Damagingby Police Power. The Searchfor Inverse Condemnation Crite-

ria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1970).

Finally, the proposed due process balancing approach would not involve the courts in
determinations that they do not make already. Presently, under the Pennsylvania Coal standard, courts weigh the public benefits of a regulation against the regulation's effect on an
individual property owner and, if the regulation is overly restrictive, determine the regulation to be a taking. The due process balancing approach would involve the same balancing
test; the only difference would be the characterization of the result. Under a due process
analysis, a regulation that unduly burdens an individual property owner would be labelled
an invalid police power regulation rather than a taking.
The Court has recently expressed a willingness to employ a more critical substantive due
process analysis when certain personal liberty rights are involved. See Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Furthermore, should examination of a landowner's burden be limited by federal doctrines of substantive due process,
the state courts would be free to employ a higher standard of substantive due process under
the state constitution than that required under the federal constitution.
104. "Just compensation" is one of the four basic elements of eminent domain, Stoebuck,
supra note 87, at 572, and is also the primary drawback to the use of the eminent domain
power in land use planning. Grant v. Mayor of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 308, 129 A.2d 363,
365-66 (1957); Costonis, supra note 99, at 1022, 1038.
105. See Costonis, supra note 99, at 1042-45. Professor Costonis has proposed that the
payment of compensation to injured landowners as a means of preserving constitutionality
could be characterized more accurately as an exercise of the "accommodation power," intermediate to the police power and the eminent domain power. Id.
106. See Comment, The Elimination of Nonconforming Uses, 1951 Wis. L. REV. 685, 69597.
107. For example, in many states the use of juries to determine compensation awards is
mandatory. See Costonis, supra note 99, at 1038-39.
108. The decisions of state courts frequently confuse the two concepts. See Mansfield &
Snett, Inc. v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 198 A. 225 (1938); W. STOEBUCK, supra
note 87, at 169, 188, 202.
109. See notes 92-95 supra and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Weitling v. County of Du Page, 26 I11.2d 196, 186 N.E.2d 291 (1962);
Goldstein v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 227 A.2d 195, 197 (R.I. 1967); Brehmer v. City of Kerrville, 320 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1959, no writ).
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balancing approach to a zoning ordinance that has required the elimination of preexisting uses. A few courts have characterized the right to continue an existing use as a vested right".. and have refused categorically to
uphold a zoning ordinance requiring the elimination of a nonconforming
use without examining the extent of either the landowner's loss or the public need."l 2 Apparently, these courts have assumed that eliminating an existing use imposes a burden on landowners that is qualitatively different
from the burden imposed by preventing a prospective use. Such an assumption is not necessarily true. The pecuniary loss caused by the pro-3
spective zoning can be as great as that caused by retroactive zoning."
One could argue that existing uses should be afforded greater protection
than future uses in order to avoid the waste that can be caused by the
Ill. See, e.g., McCaslin v. City of Monterey Park, 163 Cal. App. 2d 339, 329 P.2d 522
(1958); Town of Somers v. Camarco, 126 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1953), mod!fied and qJ'd, 284 A.D.
979, 135 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1954), afj'd, 308 N.Y. 537, 127 N.E.2d 327 (1955); Fox Lane Corp. v.
Mann, 243 N.Y. 550, 154 N.E. 600 (1926); Pelham View Apts. v. Switzer, 130 Misc. 545, 224
N.Y.S. 56 (1927). The limits of the "vested right" category are uncertain, prompting one
observer to remark, "a vested right is whatever the courts wish to protect without saying
why." Comment, The Cost ofAmortizing Non-conforming Uses, 26 U. Ci. L. REV. 442, 450
(1959). Perhaps the better view is that the indefiniteness of the category serves a valuable
function by allowing the courts to make social value judgments as to the desirability of
various activities. See Note, Amortization and PerformanceStandardsin Zoning Regulation:
Study of Existing Nonconforming Uses in an Indiana Community, 30 IND. L.J. 521, 537
(1955). For an analysis of social policy factors supporting protection of nonconforming uses,
see text accompanying notes 112-16 infra.
112. The clearest case so holding is Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14
(1930). An ordinance requiring the elimination of all nonconforming uses within one year
had been previously upheld by a Louisiana court in the cases of State ex rel. Dema Realty
Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929), and State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1929). The Jones case is one of the few reported decisions to
hold squarely that the application of zoning ordinances to existing land uses is unconstitutional. One of the few earlier cases to state a similar holding is Pelham View Apts., Inc. v.
Switzer, 130 Misc. 545, 224 N.Y.S. 56 (1927) (city cannot revoke building permit on basis of
subsequently enacted zoning ordinance when construction has begun). The validity of the
Jones holding has been accepted in dicta by courts in several jurisdictions. See, e.g., A.C.
Blumenthal & Co. v. Cryer, 71 Cal. App. 668, 236 P. 216 (1925); City of Aurora v. Burns,
319 11.84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925); Adams v. Kalamazoo Ice & Fuel Co., 245 Mich. 261, 222
N.W. 86 (1928); Cassell Realty Co. v. City of Omaha, 144 Neb. 772, 14 N.W.2d 600 (1944);
Frank J. Durkin Lumber Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 106 N.J.L. 183, 147 A. 555 (1929); Des Jardin
v. Town of Greenfield, 262 Wis. 43, 53 N.W.2d 784 (1952).
The primary reason that the issue is rarely presented for judicial review is that most nonconforming uses are protected by state statute or municipal ordinance. See notes 36-40
supra and accompanying text. Municipal regulations other than zoning ordinances have
been more frequently voided for retroactivity. See, e.g., Mt. Zion Baptist Church v. Melillo,
3 N.J. 61, 68 A.2d 741 (1949) (building ordinance cannot require reconstruction of existing
building); People v. Stanton, 126 Misc. 215, 211 N.Y.S. 438 (1925) (set-back ordinance cannot act retroactively); Brown v. Grant, 2 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1928, no
writ) (building code must relate to future). Contra, O'Donnell v. Barach, 1 111. App. 2d 157,
116 N.E.2d 912 (1953) (safety ordinance requiring handrails on stairways validly applied to
existing buildings).
113. For example, the pecuniary loss that zoning caused the landowner in the Euclid case
was substantial, and could easily exceed the loss involved in many situations requiring the
termination of a nonconforming use. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. For other
examples of extreme pecuniary loss inflicted by prospective zoning ordinances, see Neubauer v. Town of Surfside, 181 So. 2d 707 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Bolger v. Village of Mt.
Prospect, 10 11. 2d 595, 141 N.E.2d 22 (1957); Bowman v. City of Southfield, 377 Mich. 237,
140 N.W.2d 504 (1966).
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abandonment or destruction of physical improvements connected with the
use 114 and to assure landowners that their established uses will be protected, thereby encouraging them to develop their land and not merely
hold it for investment. 1 5 Many land uses, however, do not require physical structures and accordingly may be terminated without economic
waste. 116 Moreover, although land development is desirable, and therefore the presence of existing development is a factor to be considered in
applying a balancing test, existing development should not be an insurmountable barrier to the enforcement of zoning ordinances. The vested
rights approach, therefore, should yield to a thorough application of the
same balancing approach used to evaluate prospective zoning ordinances.
Several courts have failed to apply the balancing approach when the
preexisting use that an ordinance seeks to eliminate is properly classified as
a common law nuisance.' 17 In these instances, the courts have held that
nuisance uses may be immediately terminated without compensation to
the owner, despite the presence of extreme economic hardship." 8 A thorough application of the balancing test would give weight to the extent of
the public interest in the elimination of the nuisance, but would allow this
interest to be outweighed in the proper case.
C.

Compensation and the Amortization Approach

Recent state court decisions have evidenced a willingness to apply the
balancing approach in upholding ordinances that order the elimination of
114. Note, Nonconforming Uses. A Rationale and an Approach, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 91,
103 (1953).
115. Tangible improvements on land are an addition to the physical wealth of the nation,
and in many cases produce a stream of goods and services as well. Comment, supra note
S111,
at 450.
116. An example is an unimproved parking lot.
117. To constitute a common law public nuisance, a land use must injure the safety,
health, or morals of the public or work some substantial annoyance, inconvenience, or injury to the public, 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 7 (1971). Some commentators have noted a
requirement that the interferences with neighboring property owners be material and tangible. See Noel, supra note 13, at 467; Norton, supra note 7, at 312; Comment, supra note 106,
at 695.
118. Among the land uses that have been eliminated as nuisances without compensation
are junkyards (Levine v. Board of Adjustment, 125 Conn. 478, 7 A.2d 222 (1939); Finkelstein v. City of Sapulpa, 106 Okla. 297, 234 P. 187 (1925)), hospitals (Shephard v. City of
Seattle, 59 Wash. 363, 109 P. 1067 (1910)), funeral homes (State ex rel. Skillman v. City of
Miami, 101 Fla. 585, 134 So. 541 (1931)), and cemeteries (Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City of
San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358 (1910); People ex rel. Oak Hill Cemetery Ass'n v. Pratt, 129
N.Y. 68, 29 N.E. 7 (1891)). Contra, Rosehill Cemetery Co. v. City of Chicago, 366 Ill. 207, 8
N.E.2d 664 (1937). Immediate elimination of a brick kiln in Hadacheck v. Sebastion, 239
U.S. 394 (1915), discussed at text accompanying notes 83-85 supra, was also justified under a
nuisance rationale. An extreme view of the nuisance definition is presented in Yeager v.
Traylor, 306 Pa. 530, 160 A. 108 (1932) (public garage in a residential area is a nuisance per
se). The perceived distinction between nuisance and nonnuisance nonconforming uses is
discussed in Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930).
Land uses held not to constitute nuisances include gasoline storage tanks (Webb v. Alexander, 202 Ga. 443, 43 S.E.2d 668 (1947)), dance halls (Bielecki v. City of Port Arthur, 12
S.W.2d 976 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, judgmt adopted)), and a dilapidated building (Crossman v. City of Galveston, 112 Tex. 303, 247 S.W. 810 (1923)).
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nonconforming uses over a specified period of time. The leading decision
is City of Los Angeles v. Gage," 9 in which an ordinance that required the
20
removal of nonconforming uses in certain categories within five years
was declared constitutional. The court found that the five-year period afforded the owner a reasonable time in which to amortize' 2' his investment.
In addition, the court found that the monopoly position granted by the
five-year exemption was compensation for the forced removal of the business. The court stated:
The distinction between an ordinance restricting future uses and
one requiring the termination of present uses within a reasonable period of time is merely one of degree, and constitutionality depends on
the relative importance to be given to the public gain and to the private loss. . . . Use of a reasonable amortization scheme provides an
equitable means of reconciliation of the conflicting interests in satisfaction of due process requirements. . . . [I]t allows the owner of the
nonconforming use, by affording an opportunity to make new plans,
at least partially to offset any loss he might suffer. The loss he suffers,
if any, is spread out over a period of years, and he enjoys a monopolistic position by virtue of the zoning ordinance as long as he remains.
If the amortization period is reasonable the loss to the2 2owner may be
small when compared with the benefit to the public.'
Courts in several states similarly have held amortization schemes to be
constitutional when the period allowed was reasonable. 123 Others adhere
to the vested rights theory and have found amortization to be unconstitutional.' 24
119. 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954). Although an earlier case, Standard Oil
Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950), upheld an ordinance allowing a
period of grace in which the owner could "amortize" his investment, the holding was not
explicitly based on the amortization factor. Id. at 413.
120. The ordinance applied only to nonconforming uses "(1) where no buildings are employed in connection with such use; (2) where the only buildings employed are accessory or
incidental to such use; (3) where such use is maintained in connection with a nonconforming
building." 274 P.2d at 37.
121. The term "amortization" is used only by loose analogy and bears little relation to
that term's technical meaning in either law or accounting. Id. at 44; Harbison v. City of
Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 556-57, 152 N.E.2d 42, 54, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598, 615-16 (1958) (Van
Voorhis, Jr., dissenting).
Amortization provisions in zoning ordinances generally establish a certain period of time
during which a land use may continue to exist. At the expiration of this period, the use must
be terminated. The theory behind amortization is based on the principle that a property
owner should be given a period of time during which he may recover at least part of his
investment in property before he is forced to discontinue the use without compensation. 6 P.
ROHAN, supra note 20, § 41.04[l].
122. 274 P.2d at 44.
123. See, e.g., Grant v. Mayor and City Council, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957) (fiveyear amortization of billboards); Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42,
176 N.Y.S.2d 598, 615-16 (1958) (three-year amortization of a junkyard); City of Univ. Park
v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1972) (twenty-five-year amortization of unspecified commercial use).
124. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1965); City of Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697 (1953); James v. City of Greenville, 227 S.C. 565, 88
S.E.2d 661 (1955). See also Stoner McCrary Sys. v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 78
N.E.2d 843 (1956); Sun Oil Co. v. City of Upper Arlington, 55 Ohio App. 2d 27, 379 N.E.2d
266 (1977).
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From a policy standpoint, the concept of reasonable amortization is
preferable to the vested rights theory. Not only does amortization involve
the application of the balancing approach to the nonconforming use problem, but the recognition that the amortization period may serve as compensation to validate an otherwise invalid ordinance provides needed
flexibility. In some instances a land use regulation may be desirable from
a public policy standpoint but nevertheless be adjudged unconstitutional
under the balancing test because an unavoidably severe impact on one or a
few individuals outweighs the public benefit.'2 5 The provision of compensation in this situation may serve to remedy the constitutional infirmity of
such an ordinance by decreasing the burden imposed on the landowner.
Amortization, however, is only one form of compensation. Other forms
may be more useful at times, such as when immediate termination of a use
is required. Also, a reasonable amortization period could be so lengthy, as
in the case of a substantial building, that the original purpose for requiring
the elimination may have disappeared by the time the period has
elapsed."2 6 In the interim, the landowner realizes that his structure has a
finite lifetime, and may therefore allow his building to deteriorate, thus
contributing to neighborhood blight.'2 7 In this situation, the government
body should be allowed to balance the due process scale by providing
monetary compensation rather than allowing a reasonable amortization
period.
Another drawback to the amortization method, at least as presently ad128
ministered, is its inflexible application to broad categories of uses.
Within the categories, no allowance is made for mitigating factors such as
location, appearance, condition, or age.' 29 In addition, no efficient notice
mechanism exists whereby an owner is provided the opportunity to present
of his case before an ordinance is enforced against his propthe merits
30
erty. 1
The greatest shortcoming of the amortization method as it presently exists does not derive from the method itself, but from customary zoning
practices. Municipalities frequently zone much of their undeveloped land
in highly restrictive "holding patterns," which temporarily allow only the
highest form of use.131 The parcels are later downzoned as the municipal
125. This result may occur because a utilitarian standard of social benefit disregards the
manner in which the benefits and burdens are distributed among the affected individuals. A
regulation may produce an overall social benefit by producing a small benefit for a great
number of individuals while necessarily concentrating a very large burden on one or a few
individuals. Although the enactment of such a regulation may be in the public interest and
rationally related to a permissible end, the extent of the burden imposed on a few individuals may render the regulation unconstitutional.
126. See Norton, supra note 7, at 311.
127. See Comment, supra note 76, at 366.
128. See Graham, supra note 76, at 451.
129. Id.
130. Comment, supra note 76, at 362-63.
131. See D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA 61 (1971); Krasnowiecki, The Basic
System of Land Use Control" Legislative Preregulation v. Administrative Discretion, in THE
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officials receive and approve individual development proposals.' 32 As a
consequence of this practice, an official zoning designation is often meaningless.13 3 A use may be nonconforming judged by the standard of current
zoning but nevertheless may be entirely compatible with actual future development of the area. Evenhanded enforcement of all technical nonconforming uses, therefore, is purposeless. Many government officials
respond by abandoning active enforcement efforts and relying solely on
enforcement initiated by neighboring landowners. 134 Accordingly, the
amortization method
causes only a small decrease in the number of non135
conforming uses.
IV.

THE MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE

The Model Land Development Code, promulgated by the American
Law Institute in 1975, provides a framework for the comprehensive and
flexible treatment of the nonconforming use. The completed Code is the
product of more than a decade of investigation and evaluation of existing
land use planning law. 136 The Code's purpose is to provide for rational
consideration of planning goals, systematic treatment of enforcement and
judicial review, and coherent implementation of planning techniques on a
regional basis. 137 The Code is designed not as uniform legislation, but as a
series of measures that may be adopted separately as legislatures deem
appropriate. 131

Article 4 of the Code addresses nonconforming uses. The commentary
to article 4 emphasizes that the article is not merely a recodification of the
existing law of nonconforming uses;' 39 rather, it is an attempt to make
judicial treatment of the area both more rational and more effective.' 40 A
section by section examination of the article affords a comparison with
existing law, which is useful in assessing the potential consequences of the
Code's enactment.
A.

Basic Authorizationforthe Elimination of Nonconforming Uses

Section 4-101 (1) provides that "a local government. . . may require the
discontinuance of an existing land use." 141 This is the basic authorization
NEW ZONING:

(1970).

132.
133.
134.
135.
at 173

LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE AND ECONOMIC CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 3

See D. MANDELKER, supra note 131, at 62.
MLDC, Commentary on Art. 4, at 175-77.
Comment, supra note 76, at 359.
The results of surveys to this effect are reported in MLDC, Commentary on Art. 4,
(nationwide); Sussna, Abatement of Nonconforming Uses and Structures, 44 CONN.

B.J. 589, 591 (1970) (New York City); Comment, supra note 76, at 354 (Los Angeles); Note,
supra note 11I, at 523-25 (Indiana).
136. The project was conceived in 1960 by Herbert F. Goodrich, then director of the
American Law Institute.
137. Wechsler, Forewordto MLDC, at xi-xii.
138. Id. at ix-x.
139. MLDC, Commentary on Art. 4, at 177.
140. See Wechsler, Foreword to MLDC, at vii.
141. MLDC § 4-101 provides:
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for the elimination of nonconforming uses, of which the remainder of article 4 represents a qualification.
Interestingly, the Code abandons the term
"nonconforming use."' 142 Instead, it uses the term "discontinuance" as a
word of art, 43 encompassing the cessation of a land use, "or other action
necessary to restore land to its condition prior to all or any particular development."'" This definition of discontinuance provides zoning officials
with a power to eliminate existing land uses that is broader than any such
power heretofore recognized by the courts; not only may activities be prohibited, but the destruction of buildings, removal of rubble, or the rectification of excavation or landscaping activities may be required.' 4' The
definition stops short, however, of authorizing state and local governments
to require the replacement of one land use by another.
Section 4-101(2) protects against the elimination of an existing use
merely because it does not conform with the standards for future development.' 46 This section requires that the existing use must belong to a category of uses expressly designated to be discontinued in the4 same ordinance
that identifies permissible categories of future land uses. 1
(i) A local government, in the manner provided in this Article, may require the discontinuance of an existing land use. The discontinuance to be
required may include the total or partial demolition of a building or structure,
the cessation of any activity that constitutes a land use under this Code, or
other action necessary to restore land to its condition prior to all or any particular development.
(2) A local government wishing to discontinue existing land uses shall list
the categories of existing land uses to be discontinued in the development ordinance adopted under Article 2. The ordinance shall state whether the categories are to be discontinued throughout the jurisdiction of the local
government or only in specified districts or under specified conditions.
(3) Nothing in this Article limits the power of any local government to
proceed against unlawful development under Article 10, or to adopt regulations under other enabling authority requiring cessation of a business, demolition or alteration of a structure, or other change in the use of land.
"Local government" is defined in § 1-201(9) as those entities granted the basic power to
regulate land development under § 1-102(2). The latter section grants the enacting state
discretion as to the classes of local government in which it wishes to vest this power. 'Land
use" is defined in § 1-201(8) as the "development existing on land." The definition of development appears in § 1-202(1) and includes "the making of any material change in the use or
appearance of any structure of land." The broad concept of development used in the Code
was first expressed in England's Town & Country Planning Act, 1971, § 22(1). MLDC, Note
to § 1-202, at 21.
142. The official commentary states that "the confusion surrounding the meaning of this
term has contributed to the unsatisfactory state of the present law in this area." MLDC,
Commentary on Art. 4, at 181.
143. MLDC, Note on § 4-101, at 185.
144. MLDC § 4-101(1).
145. The Code's language that "any other action necessary to restore land to its condition
prior to all or any particular development" is perhaps too broad. For example, under this
wording if land were used for mining purposes, the owner could be compelled to fill in all
excavations. The cost of such restoration could be vastly disproportionate to any anticipated
benefit. See Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962), cerl.
denied, 375 U.S. 906 (1963).
146. MLDC § 4-101(2).
147. Id. § 4-101(2). The development ordinance is regulated by § 2-101, which requires
it to specify four categories of uses: development allowed as a matter of right under a general development permit, development allowed by an exercise of discretion under a special
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B.

The PlanningFunction

Section 4-102 contains a significant limitation on the broad authority
granted by section 4-10l1.48 The major purpose of this section is to coordinate the function of eliminating nonconforming uses with the planning
function stressed in article 3 of the Code. 149 The goal is to limit
mandatory discontinuance of nonconforming uses to those situations in
which a carefully considered land development plan necessitates the discontinuance.1 5 0 The Code permits the forced discontinuance of noncon-

forming uses only when the use to be discontinued is inconsistent with (1)
a neighborhood character that a local land development plan has determined to maintain for a substantial period of time;'.. (2) the charter of a

special preservation district; 5 2 (3) a plan for a specially planned area, 5 3 or

development permit, development subject to the ordinance but not requiring a permit, and
development exempted from the ordinance. The development ordinance is intended to
combine the function of present zoning and subdivision ordinances. Id. Commentary on
Art. 2, at 33.
148. MLDC § 4-102 provides:
(i) The local government may require that a category of land uses be discontinued only if:
(a) a State or Local Land Development Plan has established a policy of
maintaining a particular neighborhood character for a substantial period of
time, and the specified category of land use would be inconsistent with the
character in that neighborhood;
(b) a special preservation district has been designated under § 2-209 and
the specified category of land use would be inconsistent with the character
of the district;
(c) a plan for a specially planned area has been adopted under § 2-211,
and the specified category of land use is inconsistent with the plan;
(d) development regulations for an Area of Critical State Concern have
been adopted under § 7-203 or § 7-204, and the specified category of land
use would be inconsistent with those regulations; or,
(e) the category of land uses to be discontinued includes such land uses
as are determined by the local governing body to be offensive to the public
or to users of neighboring land, and to be performing no essential public
function that cannot readily be performed at more appropriate sites in the
region. Such determinations may be made, for example, with regard to
signs, billboards, automobile graveyards and junkyards. No category of
land use may be designated for discontinuance under this paragraph if a
Land Development Plan or other official expression of government policy
indicates that this category of land use will be compatible with the future
development of the area.
(2) No category of laud use shall be designated for discontinuance in any
area where similar new development could be undertaken upon the issuance
of a general development permit.
149. Article 3 represents a compromise between a shifting theory of planning with no
fixed goals and an "end-state" theory of planning in which preestablished goals are rigidly
adhered to. Fox, A Tentative Guide to the American Law Institute's ProposedModel Land
Development Code, 6 URB. LAW. 928, 935-36 (1974).
150. MLDC, Commentary on Art. 4, at 177.
151. Id. § 4-102(l)(a).
152. A special preservation district may be designated for any area of historical, archaeological, scientific, architectural, natural, or scenic significance, and a special discretionary
permit may be required for all development therein. Id. § 2-209. The special permit allows
the land use authorities to control development to a greater extent than under a general
permit.
153. A specially planned area designation also allows development control via use of the
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(4) regulations adopted for an area of critical state concern. 5 4 Generally,
the policy determination must meet the detailed requirements of study and
planning imposed by article 3V55
The net effect of the requirements of section 4-102 is to prohibit the
elimination of nonconforming uses whose designation as such is based
solely on a tentative zoning classification. Removal of an existing use is
authorized only when the use conflicts with a regulation that is based on
careful planning considerations. The extent to which the application of the
Code approaches its theoretical model is, of.course, dependent on the
availability of accurate information and meaningful standards on which to
base policy decisions. 156 To the extent that practice accords with theory,
strict and even-handed enforcement of nonconforming use elimination
will be made possible. Another likely effect of the Code will be careful
consideration of policy issues at the legislative level, thereby reducing the
potential for arbitrary classifications.
The sole instance in which the Code does not require long-range planning is in the removal of existing nuisances. The Code authorizes the removal of uses "offensive to the public or to users of neighboring land" that
perform "no essential public function that cannot readily be performed at
more appropriate sites in the region."' 157 Examples given in the text of the
Code include signs, billboards, automobile graveyards, and junkyards. 5 8
The official commentary suggests that such nuisances are best regulated
special permit. Id. § 2-211. The distinction is that this designation is not based on historical
or scenic characteristics of the land itself, but on a special need for coordinated planning to
promote policy goals.
154. An area of critical state concern must be related to a major public facility, an area
regionally important for historical, natural, or environmental considerations, the site of a
new community, or an area in which local authorities have failed to act. Id. § 7-201(3). In
these cases, the state may initiate planning activities after the establishment of planning
objectives. Id. § 7-201(1).
155. Specifically the plan must be based on studies of the demography, industry, housing, transportation, land use, economics, history, scenic significance, natural resources of the
area, and the financial feasibility of the plan. Id. § 3-103. From consideration of these
studies, the planners must determine the current problems of the area, project future trends,
and identify policy objectives. Id. § 3-104. The planners must then analyze the social and
economic impact of the objectives and their alternatives and prepare a short-term program
designed to achieve these objectives, which may be adopted only after public hearing and
examination by the state and any interested local government body. Id. § 3-105. The local
government is required to appoint an agency to prepare'periodic reports monitoring the
rogress of the short-term program. Id. § 3-107. Similar provisions are applicable to state
and development plans, which may cover the entire state, or any region thereof. See id.art.
8. A state need not adopt an art. 8 plan to designate an area of critical state concern.
MLDC § 7-201. The Code's reporters reasoned that the resolution of immediate problems
would be hampered by such a restriction. MDLC, Note to § 7-201, at 297-98. An exemption from the art. 3 planning requirements is afforded to smaller communities with little or
no development potential that wish to establish a special preservation district. MLDC, Note
to § 2-209, at 67. These communities may substitute a written policy report for the more
comprehensive art. 3 plan. Id. § 2-209 (bracketed portion).
156. The Code is vulnerable to criticism for its failure in many places to elucidate substantive rules to guide the discretionary judgments that the Code requires. See Fox, supra
note 149, at 949.
157. MLDC § 4-102(l)(e).
158. Id.
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outside the zoning context rather than by "regulations artificially based on
the desire to promote homogeneous land use" and that when adequate
59
nuisance remedies are in effect, the Code authorization is unnecessary.
Such a stance is consistent with and a manifestation of a Code policy not
to interfere with nonzoning regulations that may require the elimination of
existing 60
land uses such as criminal statutes, building codes, or fire ordi-

nances.'

C. Enforcement
The Code provides that nonconforming uses be eliminated by use of the
same procedural apparatus as is provided in article 10 for the enforcement
of zoning ordinances generally.' 6' Enforcement authority is vested in a
Land Development Agency, a body to be designated by the local government as its exclusive delegate in zoning administration. 62 Section 4201(1) provides that the Land Development Agency shall issue enforcement notice against each nonconforming use designed for discontinuance
in the development ordinance. Thus, once an ordinance requires the termination of uses in a given category, no discretion is allowed
in the deci16 3
sion to enforce, a marked departure from current practice.
The enforcement notice must be sent to the owner of record as well as
any other person who has filed a request to receive such notices, and must
clearly state the violation, the steps necessary to correct it, the date by
which such steps must be completed, and the possible sanctions for noncompliance.164 The recipient has two weeks from the date of mailing of

the notice to respond, within which period he may make a demand for an
administrative hearing 16 5 under hearing procedures that require notice,
159. Id., Commentary on Art. 4, at 183. Even if nuisance abatement is effected through
a separate procedure, the due process test properly would be the same as that applied to
ordinary land uses. Thus, the noxiousness of a use should not be an automatic justification
for abatement, as it is under the vested rights approach, but merely one factor to be weighed
against the burden imposed on the landowner. See text following note 118 supra.
160. See MLDC § 4-101(3).

161. An earlier draft had provided for a separate procedure for discontinuing nonconforming uses. See MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE §§ 5-201 to -202 (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 1972). MLDC § 4-201 now provides:
(1) The Land Development Agency shall issue an enforcement notice
under § 10-201 against each land use designated for discontinuance in the development ordinance.
(2) The enforcement notice shall state, in addition to the matters listed in
§ 10-201, that application may be made to the Land Development Agency for
a hearing under § 10-201(3)(e), and that at such hearing the Agency will consider the eligibility of the land use for an exemption or an extension of time
under § 4-202.
162. The concept of the Land Development Agency, formulated in MLDC § 2-301, is an
essential element of the Code. The local government is given wide discretion in choosing an
agency to operate as the Land Development Agency, but formal administrative procedures
and full disclosure are mandatory in any case to assure impartiality and rationality of decision-making. See MLDC, Note on § 2-301, at 82-83.
163. See Comment, supra note 76, at 359; text accompanying notes 133-34 supra.
164. MLDC § 10-201.
165. Id. § 10-201(3)(e).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 33

testimony under oath, opportunity for cross-examination, and a decision
based on a written record.66 In addition, the recipient may seek judicial
review.167 If the adjudicatory hearing is not requested, section 4-202 reLand Development Agency to order discontinuance of the viothe
quires 16
8
lation.
If the landowner does request a hearing, however, he is entitled to
demonstrate that he qualifies for an exemption, an extension of time, or
some measure of compensation. 169 These remedies resemble the current
remedies of summary abatement, 70 amortization, 17 ' and eminent domain. 172 The novelty of the Act, however, is its coordination of the various remedies in a common enforcement procedure, thus providing a full
range of alternative remedies in each case and a full hearing in which the
most efficient and equitable solution to the particular problem may be determined.
The first remedy, exemption from enforcement, may be granted the
landowner in three situations. First, he may obtain a reconsideration of
166. Id. § 2-304. The requirements for a hearing imposed by the Code are adapted from
the requirements of an adjudicatory hearing under the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1976). See MLDC, Note on § 2-304, at 92.
167. MLDC § 10-202(3).
168. Id. § 10-202(2).
169. Id. § 4-202 provides:
(1) The Land Development Agency shall issue an enforcement order
under § 10-202 requiring discontinuance within [one month] of a land use for
which an enforcement notice has been issued, unless the Agency finds on the
basis of the hearing thereon that the land use is entitled to an exemption or
extension of time, or that an interest in the land should be acquired by the
local government.
(2) The Land Development Agency may exempt a land use from discontinuance if it finds that:
(a) none of the grounds for discontinuing land uses required under § 4102 are applicable to the specific land use in question; or
(b) the hardship caused by the discontinuance would outweigh the public benefits thereof, provided that evaluation of the public benefits of discontinuance shall take into consideration benefits that may result from
discontinuance of other similar land uses; or
(c) a special development permit to allow continuance of the land use
should be granted under Article 2, in which case the Agency shall treat the
application for a hearing as an application for a special development permit.
(3) The Land Development Agency may grant an extension of time in order to allow a reasonable time for discontinuance of land use. In determining
a reasonable time the Agency shall take into consideration:
(a) the probable extent of the economic usefulness of the land use;
(b) the urgency of the public purpose requiring discontinuance; and
(c) the cost of discontinuance to the owner.
(4) If the Land Development Agency concludes that the extension of time
necessary to provide a reasonable time for discontinuance of a land use would
exceed three years, it shall notify the local governing body prior to issuance of
the enforcement order so that the local governing body may elect to acquire
an interest in the land under § 5-102 in order to assure the earlier discontinuance of the land use.
170. See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
171. See notes 121-24 supra and accompanying text.
172. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
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whether discontinuance of the particular use is in fact justified by the articulated planning purpose on which the ordinance is based. 173 Secondly,
he is entitled to show individual hardship sufficient to outweigh the public
benefit under the balancing test.' 7 4 Thirdly, the landowner may qualify
for a special permit to continue the nonconforming use. 175 In contrast to
the absence of discretion in the initial decision to eliminate a use, a large
amount of discretion is afforded the hearing examiner in the decision to
grant an exemption. This divergence in the scope of discretion allowed
may be justified in that the formalities and required public disclosure of
the hearing procedure can shield the exercise of discretion from improper
political pressures.' 76
When an exception from enforcement is not warranted, a second remedy may entitle a landowner to a reasonable time within which to discontinue a use. Under the Code, determination of the reasonable time is made
after balancing the probable extent of the economic usefulness of the existing land use,' 77 the cost of discontinuance to the owner,' 78 and the urgency of the public purpose requiring discontinuance.' 79 Unlike existing
practice, 180 the test operates on a case-by-case basis, a method that allows
for the consideration of mitigating factors such as location, condition, or
aesthetics.
Finally, a third remedy in the form of compensation may be available if
a reasonable period within which to discontinue a use will exceed three
years. In such a situation, the Land Development Agency is required to
notify the local government.' 8' The local government then has the option
to acquire an interest in the land in lieu of allowing the amortization period. "8' 2 This option has the virtue of providing a means whereby those
uses that are particularly meddlesome may be promptly eliminated, even
when substantial structures are involved. 183 Acquisition of an interest in
land, however, represents an exercise of the eminent domain power, and
173.

MLDC § 4-202(2)(a).

174. Id. § 4-202(2)(b). The agency may allot special weight to the value of uniform enforcement, however. See id., Note on § 4-202, at 191.

175. MLDC § 4-202(2)(c). This provision grants the nonconforming user the same right
as any other landowner to qualify for a special development permit under any of the numerous provisions of § 2-201.
176. The Code places reliance on formal procedures and disclosure rather than on tenure
and quorum requirements to promote depolitization of the decision-making process. See
MLDC, Note on § 2-301, at 83.
177. MLDC § 4-202(3)(a).
178. Id. § 4-202(3)(c).
179. Id. § 4-202(3)(b). The three factors present an application of the due process balancing, with the first two factors relating to individual burdens and the third factor to the

collective benefit. See notes 102-07 supra and accompanying text.
180. See notes 128-30 supra and accompanying text.
181. MLDC § 4-202(4).

182. Id. § 5-102 allows a governmental agency to acquire an interest in land as a means
of securing the discontinuance of a nonconforming use.
183. Compare existing practice in which a substantial building must be granted an amortization period of such duration that the effectuation of planning goals is impossible. See
text accompanying note 126 supra.
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the landowner must be compensated. 184 The government need not
purchase is the right
purchase the fee simple interest, however; all it need
185
to maintain certain uses or structures on the land.
The Code's reference to purchase of a land interest is unfortunate in that
it incorporates the conceptual error introduced by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal.'86 Land use restriction is not literally a taking in that no
interest is transferred to the government. 187 Compensation of the landowner, therefore, need not take the form of a purchase. Instead, compensation can be granted in order to balance the due process scales when the
burden on an individual is high.
In sum, article 4's enforcement procedures provide a flexible method by
which to eliminate nonconforming uses. The justification of each enforcement application in light of its policy objective is required, as is the individual tailoring of the remedy for efficiency and fairness.
D. Regulation of Existing Uses
The Code contains no special provisions for restricting the alteration,
88
expansion, or resumption after discontinuance of nonconforming uses.'
Instead, the same measures that regulate these activities for ordinary uses
govern nonconforming uses as well.189 For example, the Code would classify a modification merely as a development that "will continue the type of
use then existing on the parcel,"' 9 ° but would deviate from the general
development plan. Such development may be allowed under a special development permit "if compliance with the general development provisions
would cause practical difficulties."'' Since the mere presence of nonconforming use status is itself defined as a "practical difficulty,"' 92 such a use
may be modified if the modification differs from permitted development
no more than necessary to overcome the practical difficulties and such use
will not significantly interfere with the enjoyment of other land in the vicinity. 193
The Code treatment of modification is salutary. Because section 4-101
authorizes the removal of any nonconforming use that significantly interferes with development, ordinances would no longer need to prohibit modification of nonconforming uses as an indirect means of eliminating those
uses. Instead, a modification could be examined on its own merits.
184. See note 99 supra and accompanying text. Although the constitutionality of eminent domain as a means of land control has been established, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954), its use has been criticized because of its cost and administrative complexity. Grant v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 308, 129 A.2d 363, 365-66 (1957). E. BASSET, ZONING 27
(1936), quoted in Comment, supra note 106, at 696.
185. See MLDC, Note on § 5-102, at 204.
186. See notes 96-99 supra and accompanying text.
187. See notes 96-98 supra and accompanying text.
188. Compare existing practice summarized at text accompanying notes 41-73 supra.
189. MLDC, Commentary on Art. 4, at 180-81.
190. Id. § 2-202(1).
191. Id.
192. Id. § 2-202(2)(b).
193. Id. § 2-202(I).
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Assume that a landowner seeks to change one nonconforming use to
another nonconforming use or to resume a nonconforming use after its
discontinuance. Under the Code, such action would constitute development.' 94 The development of a new nonconforming use, by definition,
would not be allowed under a general development permit.195 The landowner, however, could procure a special developmental permit. Such a
permit would be granted only if disallowance would deprive the owner of
all economic use of the property, the proposed development differs from
the general development plan no more than is necessary to permit an economic use,' 9 6 and the use and enjoyment of land in the vicinity is not
harmed. 97 Thus, the Code continues a policy of not favoring the resumption of old or the establishment of new nonconforming uses. 19 8 This
stance is justified insofar as it may be assumed that the development permitted under a general development permit was chosen rationally. The
landowner in these situations is seeking to establish a new use and is properly placed in the same category as any other landowner attempting to
establish a use in conflict with the zoning regulations.
V.

CONCLUSION

The presence of a land use that is grossly incompatible with the future
development strategy of a growing area can obstruct the orderly and rational growth of metropolitan areas. As the rate of metropolitan development intensifies, waiting for an incompatible use to dissipate by natural
causes and by governmental restrictions on the use's growth, change, or
discontinuance is increasingly unsatisfactory. Ordinances requiring the
elimination of nonconforming uses, 'while more effective, are potentially
unconstitutional. Predicting whether an ordinance will be unconstitutional, however, is difficult in light of the confusion as to the proper constitutional framework within which to analyze the problem of the
nonconforming use. Early cases upheld regulations that impinged on a
landowner's property rights without compensation if the regulations represented a reasonable use of the police power to accomplish a legitimate end.
To avoid the harsh results of these decisions, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon held that an unduly oppressive regulation could be an unconstitutional taking of property, thereby confusing the police power and the eminent domain power. The equitable result of Pennsylvania Coal could have
been achieved without sacrificing definitional consistency by application of
the due process clause to balance the social.gain produced by a regulation
against the landowner's loss. While state courts have recognized the general validity of a balancing approach, they have failed to apply it consistently in treating the nonconforming use. Instead, courts have either
194. See id. § 1-202.

195. This is a tautology since the use is made nonconforming by reference to the development ordinance and the ordinance cannot authorize what it forbids.
196. MLDC § 2-204(1).
197. Id. § 2-204(2).
198. See notes 41-43 & 64-73 supra and accompanying text.
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categorically protected nonconforming uses from the operation of zoning
ordinances or, if the use was also a nuisance, categorically eliminated it
without compensation. The recent trend of upholding zoning ordinances
requiring the amortization of nonconforming uses within a reasonable
time, however, represents the application of a balancing approach in that
the amortization period is considered to be compensation for the landowner's loss. Amortization, however, falls short of being a thorough application of the balancing test in that the amortization period is the only
means of compensation considered and precludes immediate removal of a
nonconforming use even in urgent circumstances. Furthermore, the prevalent use of "wait-and-see" zoning has rendered technical zoning violations
substantially meaningless.
Article 4 of the Model Land Development Code attempts to remedy
these problems. Under this proposal, a nonconforming use may be abated
only if the acting local government has developed a comprehensive plan
with which the use substantially conflicts, or the use is of a particularly
obnoxious quality. Procedurally, the landowner is provided an adjudicatory hearing within which to develop the factual circumstances of his particular case and to select an appropriate remedy. The Code's procedural
framework is readily adaptable to implementation of a full-scale balancing
approach, although the Code itself continues the confusion between police
power and eminent domain power. In aid of consistency, the nonconforming use is not further stigmatized by requiring it to conform with regulations regarding its extension, alteration, or discontinuance other than those
that are made applicable to land uses in general.
Article 4 is an improvement over existing law in three respects: (1) it
isolates those uses, the elimination of which may further a compelling public purpose; (2) it affords a common procedure under which the merits of a
variety of corrective measures can be analyzed; and (3) it treats the nonconforming use in a manner more consistent with the treatment of other
land uses. States that could benefit by these effects would do well to consider statutory enactment of this portion of the Model Land Development
Code.

